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Abstract 
Statements such as “X is beautiful but I don’t like how it looks” or “I like how X looks but it 
is not beautiful” sound contradictory. How contradictory they sound might however depend 
on the object X and on the aesthetic adjective being used (“beautiful”, “elegant”, “dynamic”, 
etc.). In our study, the first sentence was estimated to be more contradictory than the latter: 
If we describe something as beautiful, we often intend to evaluate its appearance, whereas it 
is less counterintuitive to appreciate an appearance without finding it beautiful. Furthermore, 
statements including “beautiful” appeared more contradictory than those including “elegant” 
and “dynamic”, pointing to its greater evaluative component. When related to artworks, 
sentences could appear less contradictory due to readers’ consideration of the divergence 
between conventional beauty and art-related sensory pleasures that can even include 
negative valence. Such ambivalence might be more frequent in art-objects than in other 
artefacts. Indeed, in our study, sentences referring to artworks were estimated to be less 
contradictory compared to sentences referring to other artefacts. Meanwhile, an additional 
small group of graphic design students showed a less clear difference between art-related 
and non-art-related sentences. We discuss the potential influence of art experience and 
interest as well as theoretical and methodological challenges like the conceptualization of 
beauty.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“This teacup is beautiful but I don’t like how it looks” – how contradictory this sounds 
depends on the adjective utilized to describe the object and it might also depend on the 
object in question. You might have been less confused if you read “This teacup is elegant 
but I don’t like how it looks” or “This drawing is beautiful but I don’t like how it looks”. 
Aesthetic statements1 involve an evaluation; the contrast to sensory non-appeal therefore 
causes a tension. We will argue that artworks allow for greater diversity of resources of 
pleasure than non-art artefacts: Their sensory appeal might not rely on hedonic states 
induced by the works’ features or motives (alone) but as well on artistic values, rewarding 
insight in one’s own experience or other art-related pleasures of the mind. This becomes 
evident, e.g., from appreciated artworks that depict a motive of negative valence. A reader’s 
consideration of such possibilities of divergence might lead to reduction in how 
contradictory aesthetic statements of this kind appear when they refer to art instead to non-
art. Familiarity with ambivalent artworks might therefore be relevant for the interpretation of 
such seemingly contradictory aesthetic statements.  
First, we introduce the evaluative component of aesthetic statements (see 2.1), describe 
potential specifics of this evaluation in case the statements refer to art-related objects (see 
2.2) and examine the possible role of readers’ art experience (see 2.3). After presenting 
concrete hypotheses (see 2.4), we present an experiment that compared how contradictory 
different kinds of aesthetic statements appear to readers, some of them referring to art-
related objects, others to non-art artefacts (see 3). Finally, we will discuss implications and 
open questions (see 4). 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 The evaluative component of aesthetic statements 
Aesthetic statements of the form “X is A” (“X” representing a term referring to an object, 
“A” representing a positive aesthetic adjective, such as “beautiful”, “elegant”, “graceful”, 
etc.) are evaluative as we express an appreciation of the object to which “X” refers. This is 
why the sentences quoted above sound contradictory. The most basic questions we can ask 
concerning this evaluative component are:  
 
I) Is the evaluative component generally part of the semantic content of an aesthetic 
statement?  
II) Is the evaluative component different for variants of aesthetic statements? 
 
One possibility to empirically examine question I) is to analyze sentences of the following 
form: “X is A, but I don’t like X”. In this sentence the evaluative component of an aesthetic 
statement (“X is A”) is explicitly cancelled (“…, but I don’t like X”). If the evaluative 
component is part of the semantic content, then cancelling this component should be 
infelicitous in the sense that “X is A, but I don’t like X” should sound highly contradictory.  
                                                
1 We refer to sentences which involve an aesthetic predicate as “aesthetic statements” 
throughout this text. 
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If we insert “beauty” for “A”, we expect statements to appear contradictory given the 
conceptual overlap between beauty and liking. If we consider cases in which sensory 
impressions are involved, a slight variation of the mentioned sentence should make it appear 
even more contradictory: “X is beautiful, but I don’t like how X looks or sounds.” (We 
mention two sensory modalities only as they were included in the empirical approach; a 
modality-specific analysis is out of the scope of this work). If no contradiction evolves, we 
can assume that the evaluative component of aesthetic statements is neither part of their 
content as such nor is it a conventional implicature (i.e., not expressed by the sentence due 
to mere convention, Grice, 1989).  
Consider that “beauty” refers to an object whereas “liking” refers to an individual’s 
mental state: At least in rare cases, an object could be in conflict with criteria for (what the 
observer deems to be) conventional beauty (such as harmony or symmetry) but its 
appearance could be liked (e.g., because it is thrilling or interesting or serves as a souvenir). 
Marković demarcates the pleasure by beautiful features from aesthetic “pleasures of the 
mind” referring to a concept by Kubovy (1999) and states that “even ugly things can elicit 
aesthetic experience (eg, aesthetic fascination with deformation, monstrous, grotesque, 
morbid, horrible, and other kinds of ugliness; cf Eco 2004, 2007)” (Marković, 2012, p. 2). 
Pleasures of the mind are qualified by temporal patterns of emotion and intensities of these 
emotions (e.g., curiosity, virtuosity or surprise). Meanwhile, we should be cautious when 
contrasting them to beauty, because beauty can also be understood in terms of a response of 
an observer, shaped by the coupling between observer and environment (see also Chatterjee, 
2014). Beauty can also be understood with reference to a “free beauty” (Kant, 1790/1951) as 
an emotion that merges meaningfulness and uncertainty with a focus on self-extension not 
on prevention and safety. Pleasure and liking would in contrast be related to fluent 
processing and a focus on security (Armstrong & Detweiler-Bedell, 2008; see also the role 
of security for responses to kitsch and art; Ortlieb & Carbon, 2019, and to innovation; 
Carbon, 2013). It seems plausible that pleasures of the mind potentially arise from such 
dynamic changes in uncertainty and meaningfulness. A rough interpretation of this rationale 
is that something can look or sound displeasing (e.g., by being perceptually challenging) but 
on the other hand beautiful as it allows for an active meaningful engagement enriching a 
person’s mind (see also effects of ambiguity and insight on interest; Muth, Hesslinger, & 
Carbon, 2015).  
To further examine the relationship between beauty and sensory appeal, compare 
how contradictory the following two sentences appear to you: 
 
(a1) I like how X looks (or sounds) but X is not beautiful. 
(a2)  X is beautiful but I do not like how X looks (or sounds). 
 
When (a1) seems less contradictory to readers than (a2), we could infer that the sentences 
are not commutative and therefore beauty and sensory appeal do not amount to the same 
thing; in exaggerated terms: Whereas sensory appeal would be taken as a necessary 
condition for beauty (a2), it would not be taken as sufficient because something could be 
appealing without being beautiful (a1). At the same time, beauty could refer to aspects 
which do not strictly appeal to the senses (like thoughts or mathematical formulae, see also 
Chatterjee, 2014) and therefore beauty might as well combinable with sensory non-appeal. 
With regard to question II), we can assume that if the level of “appearing 
contradictory” is a useful measure of the evaluative component, differences in this 
component regarding beauty and other adjectives describing an aesthetic value of X should 
be reflected by differences in how contradictory the following sentences appear: 
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(a2)  X is beautiful but I do not like how X looks (or sounds). 
(b)  X is elegant but I do not like how X looks (or sounds). 
(c)  X is dynamic but I do not like how X looks (or sounds). 
 
 
2.2 Aesthetic statements about art 
In this section, we examine potential specifics of evaluations regarding art-related objects. It 
is debatable whether artworks evoke aesthetic responses that are profoundly different from 
those to everyday objects (see e.g., discussion by Graham, 2000). An aesthetic attitude 
which allows for gaining sensory pleasures could generally refer to each and every object; 
imagine the shift in perspective when elaborating on aesthetic qualities of a rotten tree. 
Furthermore, aesthetic responses to art and non-art can involve conflicting emotional 
contents, “mixed” emotions combining positive and negative responses like when being 
moved (Menninghaus et al., 2015) or experiencing the shock and delight of an “Awe” 
experience by a sublime landscape (Konečni, 2005; but see S. Ortlieb, Fischer, & Carbon, 
2016). Meanwhile, we argue that aesthetic statements about artworks could be more easily 
combinable with contrasting evaluative notions than statements about other artefacts 
because people might consider that the sensory appearance of an artwork can be evaluated 
along a larger set and pattern of dimensions. These might be combinable or even include 
negative hedonic responses. More concretely, we base this assumption upon four broad 
arguments: 
A) Specific values and functions applied to art. An evolutionary account describes art 
making as the important basic faculty of humans to “make things special” (e.g., by 
repetition, exaggeration, formalization, etc.) and to enjoy these creations (Dissanayake, 
2009). Artistic manipulations of material or their re-contextualization often play with 
perceptual automatisms which guide our actions in everyday life, inducing Semantic 
instability (Muth & Carbon, 2016), experiences of multistability or visual indeterminacy 
(not only Modern Western art, Gamboni, 2002; Krieger & Mader, 2010). This way, an 
artwork could not only be valued due to what it depicts but also due to the way it heightens 
awareness to our own emotions or to sensory experience itself (e.g., making otherwise 
automatized perception itself "visible", Fiedler, 1971) with a potential transfer to our 
understanding and experience of the world (Graham, 2000). People might therefore often 
associate art with situations in which we assign value to experiential quality itself – even if it 
includes uncertainty, sadness or ugliness. We should note again that a reflexive experiential 
mode is not restricted to art, not each artwork induces it and artworks can have beautiful 
features and can be entertaining. Meanwhile, artworks potentially have an additional specific 
function: In contrast to non-art artefacts, we can for instance evaluate sensory impressions of 
artworks regarding both aesthetic and artistic criteria. On one hand, it is possible that 
sensory impressions are aesthetically pleasing but at the same time artistically of a negative 
value (lacking relevance, being boring, etc.). On the other hand, artworks can displease 
aesthetically but be of high value artistically. Having such experiences in mind, readers 
might estimate the sentences to appear less contradictory in case of art because artworks can 
be valuable despite negative hedonic responses due to the reflexive processes they evoke 
and the artistic values we assign to them.  
B) Dichotomy of representational art. When it comes to art, we are often dealing 
with multiple levels of perception: e.g., when looking at representational paintings, we can 
focus on the material (e.g., paper and color) or on the depicted scene; more precisely: We 
see the scene within the material of the artwork (see Wollheim, 1982 or more recent ideas on 
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“dichotomy” by Pepperell, 2015). Such dichotomous facets of experience might be 
perceived as valuable despite (or sometimes even because of) dis-pleasure or negative affect 
induced by some of the artwork’s sensory features. Consider a painting of Christ on a cross. 
Our emotional response might be influenced by the motive’s expression but we do not see 
and respond to Christ on a cross but instead to an artistic depiction of Christ on a cross. The 
dichotomy of representations allows for evaluations of the depicted motive and the way of 
depiction alike (material, style, virtuosity, etc.), as well as their interaction. It is for instance 
well possible that an artistic quality is evaluated positively despite a displeasing sujet and 
vice versa. Furthermore, a sujet can be presented in such a way that makes perceivers gain 
valuable insight about experience (see also argument A), e.g., by the selection of perspective 
or the distribution of detail. Sentences which combine non-appeal with different evaluative 
notions (beautiful, dynamic, elegant, etc.) might appear less contradictory if they refer to 
artworks due to this dichotomy.  
C) Ambivalence in art. Ambivalent sensory pleasures are not exclusive for art but art 
might often promote them as well as their expectation (Muth & Carbon, 2016; Muth et al., 
2015). Pleasures of the mind are not emotions by themselves but qualified by patterns and 
intensities of emotions (Kubovy, 1999). We can imagine pleasurable interplays between 
tensions and resolutions, disturbingness and interest, semantic instabilities and insight or 
uncertainty and meaningfulness. Hereby, negative emotion might even be valuable as it can 
increase, e.g., affective intensity, involvement, attention and memory (Menninghaus et al., 
2017). Negative emotions in art might not necessarily lead to aversion due a combination of 
a psychological distance that is induced, e.g., by the schema of art and so called embracing 
factors that serve to render negative emotions enjoyable and integrate them in the aesthetic 
experience (e.g., mixed emotions like being moved or meaning construction, Menninghaus 
et al., 2017). It is a highly discussed question if art provides emotion or if it heightens 
awareness to emotion without necessarily making us undergo these emotions (e.g., Graham, 
2000). Participants sometimes report “expressed” emotions whereas they do not actually feel 
them given the specificity of responses to art. Something might sound sad but it does not 
necessarily make me sad, it might be expressive of sadness but not in each case induce 
sadness (Kivy, 1989; Konečni, 2008) and be attractive (e.g., Weth, Raab, & Carbon, 2015). 
Meanwhile, people are indeed affected by a negative emotional connotation of a visual 
artwork despite its more positive evaluation in an art context (Gerger, Leder, & Kremer, 
2014). With reference to reports of genuine emotional responses by correlates in 
physiological measures, Menninghaus et al. (2017) conclude that negative emotions are 
actually felt in such aesthetic contexts, but still can be positively related with liking and 
enjoyment.  
Whereas a transfer from ambivalent emotion to contrasting aesthetic evaluations is 
not straight forward, such “paradox of tragedy” (Hume, 1757/1874; see also Smuts, 2009) 
might be relevant when it comes to the evaluative component of aesthetic statements: 
Aesthetic statements on art can reflect wether people consider the possibility of a 
combination between negative valence and pleasures of the mind. The specific pattern of 
induced pleasure might hereby vary greatly between different artworks and include 
contrasting dimensions; disturbing art was for instance found to be interesting but not 
pleasant (Turner & Silvia, 2006). We therefore hypothesize that ambivalence might be 
rather typical for our conception of affective responses to art. Associations with such 
experiences might lead to a decrease in how contradictory sentences appear if they combine 
sensory pleasure with non-beauty or sensory displeasure with beauty. If these sentences refer 
to an artwork, then readers who are familiar with ambivalence in art will probably interpret 
them along the lines of "X induces sensory pleasures in me but no positive complex 
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pleasures of the mind” or "X induces complex pleasures of the mind but no sensory 
pleasures in me". We expect that depending on their experience and interest in art, 
participants will therefore have a reading of the sentences that partially resolves the tension 
responsible for the felt contradiction. 
D) An alternative explanation would draw upon the rather Eurocentric understanding of 
art prevalent in many theories and the public understanding of art (see critique by 
Dissanayake, 2009). People’s differentiation between sentences on art vs. non-art might 
therefore be largely based upon Western Modern to Post-modern and Contemporary 
artworks that contrast conventional beauty in a pronounced manner. Accepting non-appeal 
as beautiful and vice versa might even serve social distinction when associating it with 
preference for artistic ambiguity (e.g., Krieger & Mader, 2010). 
 
 
2.3 The role of art experience and interest 
The emotional dynamics of a person during elaboration, her appreciation of style and 
virtuosity, the estimation of complexity and levels of understanding and the reward by 
reflecting her own experience might all be affected by experience and socialization. The 
value assigned to the described potential dimensions – especially if they are contrasted with 
negative evaluative notions – therefore should be influenced by familiarity with artworks 
and trainings, e.g., in detecting style or theoretical background. This is reflected by studies 
either comparing responses before and after training or comparing responses by people with 
varying experience with art. It was shown that art-inexperienced participants like 
challenging portraits more after elaborating them (but not those that are fluently processed, 
Belke, Leder, & Carbon, 2015). And training increases interest as well as comprehension of 
complex art, but not the structure of appraisals that evoke interest (comprehension and 
complexity, Silvia, 2006). Whereas art-experienced people appreciate challenge and 
complexity more and rather respond to structural aspects of a work of art, inexperienced 
people relate evaluations more often to positive emotional responses of pleasantness and 
warmth (Winston & Cupchik, 1992). There is however a risk of following a normative 
understanding of art perception here: Rejection of conventional forms of beauty and a 
preference for ambiguity might also reflect goals of social distinction (as supposed by 
Krieger & Mader, 2010) – this might as well account for acceptance of contrasting notions 
of sensory appeal and beauty.  
 
 
2.4 Hypotheses 
We conducted an empirical study which assessed how contradictory sentences appear given 
a variety of aesthetic adjectives and objects. Statements in the format of “I like how X looks 
(or sounds)” are evaluations of sensory impressions that explicitly refer to personal 
responses of speakers. Aesthetic statements in the format of “X is beautiful” do not 
explicitly refer to personal responses. Nevertheless, aesthetic statements of this kind often 
involve an evaluation of sensory impressions as well. Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that sentences (a1) and (a2) should appear contradictory or counterintuitive to 
readers: 
 
(a1)    I like how it looks (sounds), but X is not beautiful. 
(a2)    X is beautiful, but I do not like how it looks (sounds). 
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But an object’s sensory appearance could indeed be liked without being beautiful because 
there are various pleasures of the mind which potentially include or exclude beauty. This 
might not only account for functional or conceptual aspects but also comprise qualities of 
sensory appearance. At the same time, beauty might either describe a match to standards for 
pleasing attributes or a kind of challenging meaningfulness. In some cases it might also refer 
to non-sensory aspects of an object (e.g., a thought can be beautiful). An object can therefore 
also be beautiful despite a non-appealing sensory appearance. 
Given the lack of conceptual clarity regarding “beauty” and the fact that objects might be 
visually (auditorily) appealing for various reasons, we compare responses to both sentential 
formats in an exploratory manner without a directed hypothesis. Four outcomes are possible: 
First, suppose both (a1) and (a2) are not considered to be contradictory at all, then personal 
sensory appeal would be neither necessary nor sufficient for classifying an object as 
beautiful. Second, suppose (a1) and (a2) are both considered to be highly contradictory, then 
this would suggest that personal sensory appeal would be necessary and sufficient for 
classifying something as beautiful. In this case sensory appeal and beauty would more or 
less amount to the same thing. Third, suppose (a1) is judged to be highly contradictory 
whereas (a2) is not, then sensory appeal would be sufficient for X to be classified as 
beautiful, but it would not be necessary. In this case, even though people tend to classify 
every sensory appealing object as beautiful, they still allow for beautiful objects that are not 
appealing to the senses. Fourth, (a2) is judged to be highly contradictory whereas (a1) is not, 
then sensory appeal would be necessary for X to be classified as beautiful, but it would not 
be sufficient. In this case people would take sensory appeal as a precondition for beauty, but 
take beauty not to be exhausted by sensory appeal. In other words, they would consider 
cases of sensory appeal beyond beauty.  
Furthermore, we tested how contradictory sentences appear when “beautiful” is 
exchanged by other aesthetic adjectives, namely “elegant” and “dynamic”:  
 
(b)    X is elegant but I do not like how it looks (or sounds). 
(c)    X is dynamic but I do not like how it looks (or sounds).   
 
We hypothesized that “beautiful” contains a larger evaluative component than those other 
adjectives and that therefore (a2) yields higher values regarding contradiction than (b) and 
(c) (Hypothesis 1). We chose only two further adjectives and forwent to test corresponding 
sentences to the format of (a1) in order to avoid potential fatigue during the evaluation of the 
sentences.  
Additionally, we suggest that “X is beautiful” and “I like how it looks (or sounds)” can 
have different readings – especially if “X” refers to an artwork. “I like how X looks (or 
sounds)” can be understood as referring to (i) simple sensory appeal or (ii) to higher and 
more complex pleasures of the mind induced by sensory features of the artwork (see section 
2.2). Analogously, “X is beautiful” might also be understood (i) as referring to sensory 
features of the artwork that induce simple sensuous pleasures or (ii) as referring to features 
that induce more elaborated and complex pleasures of the mind. Note that in this case these 
features might comprise non-sensory aspects (think of concept art or participatory art) as 
well as sensory aspects (think of the dichotomy between motive and material composition or 
artistic and stylistic values). Given that the same is true with respect to the corresponding 
negations of the sentences “I do not like how it looks (or sounds)” and “X is not beautiful”, 
there are some possible readings of the sentences (a1) and (a2) that are not contradictory. 
With respect to (a1), for example, such readings are:  
 
Statements on appeal of non-beauty 
8 
 
(a1’)  X induces simply sensuous pleasure in me (see (i)), but it does not have features 
(sensory or non-sensory) that induce more complex pleasures of the mind (see (ii)). 
(a1’’)  X induces complex pleasures of the mind in me due to its sensory features (see (ii)), 
but it does not induce simple sensuous pleasure in me (see (i)). 
 
Given that artworks often induce pleasures of the mind despite displeasing sensory attributes 
and considering people’s reflections on experiences with such ambivalence, such non-
contradictory readings of the sentences should be more easily available if the sentences refer 
to artworks. Therefore, we hypothesize that the sentences to be tested appear less 
contradictory if they refer to artworks (Hypothesis 2). 
 Finally, the difference between art-related and non-art-related sentences might be 
pronounced when people are more familiar with art. Their understanding of art might be 
dominated by Western Modern to Contemporary “high” art which contrasts hedonic and 
sensuous pleasure in many cases. Stating its sensory-appeal might furthermore serve social 
distinction via the rejection of conventional forms of beauty. In addition, people with low 
experience were reported to show a tendency to focus on pleasingness of features and not on 
style or structure when evaluating art. This could increase the perceived contradiction when 
pleasure of the mind collides with sensory displeasing attributes. Thus, for art-experienced 
readers, non-contradictory readings of the sentences (i.e., readings along the lines of (a1’) 
and (a1’’)), should be more easily available. We therefore hypothesized lower ratings of 
how contradictory the sentences appear to people with higher experience with and interest in 
art (Hypothesis 3). 
In summary, the explorative question and specific hypotheses to be tested are:  
 
Explorative question: How contradictory do the following sentences appear to readers: (a1) 
“I like how X looks (sounds) but it is not beautiful”; (a2) “X is beautiful, but I don’t like 
how X looks (sounds).”  
 
Hypothesis 1: (a2) “X is beautiful, but I don’t like how X looks (sounds)” appears more 
contradictory to readers than (b) “X is dynamic, but I don’t like how X looks (sounds)” and 
(c) ”X is elegant, but I don’t like how X looks (sounds)”. 
 
Hypothesis 2: All sentences appear less contradictory if “X” is an art-related concept. 
 
Hypothesis 3: All sentences appear even less contradictory if “X” is an art-related concept 
and if readers are highly experienced with and interested in art.” 
 
 
 
3. Method 
 
3.1 Participants 
Forty participants took part in the study and were tested individually in an experimental lab 
of the University of Bamberg (31 female, 8 male, 1 other; Mage=26.7 years; SDage=8.8; 
rangeage=17-51 years; referred to as “non-trained participants” in the following). Thirty of 
them were students of psychology–they gained course credit for their participation. The 
other participants were recruited via word of mouth from the general public. A Snellen eye 
chart test and a subset of the Ishihara color cards ensured that they had normal or corrected-
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to-normal vision. In addition, we tested 14 undergraduate students of graphic design at the 
Akademie Faber-Castell, Stein/Germany, in a group setting at the beginning of a seminar 
(referred to as “trained participants” in the following). Data of one participant was excluded 
from the analyses due to a complete lack of replies to the questionnaire on art experience 
and interest (remaining 13 participants: 9 female; Mage=22.0 years; SDage=2.2; rangeage=19-
27 years). All participants were naïve to the purpose of the study.  
 
 
3.2 Stimuli  
We presented 56 sentences in random order, consisting of 14 exemplars of each of the 
following formats: 
 
(a1) I like how X looks (sounds) but X is not beautiful. 
(a2) X is beautiful, but I don’t like how X looks (sounds). 
 
(b) X is dynamic, but I don’t like how X looks (sounds). 
(c)  X is elegant, but I don’t like how X looks (sounds). 
 
X was replaced by seven art-related concepts (installation, artwork, song, sculpture, collage, 
painting, drawing) and seven concepts of non-art artefacts (lamp, jacket, table, closet, 
bicycle, vase, basic commodity). If “song” was included, we wrote “… how the song 
sounds”.  
 
 
3.3 Procedure 
Participants evaluated the sentences one after the other via a 7-point-scale on the “level of 
appearing contradictory”, as we will call it in the following. The original question in 
German was: “Wie widersprüchlich klingt dieser Satz?” (“How contradictory does this 
sentence sound?”). Before evaluation, they read an instruction elaborating on the intended 
meaning of “contradictory” (see Table A1 in Appendix). After each set of 14 sentences, 
participants had the opportunity to pause and relax. Finally, each participant filled in a 
questionnaire on experience with and interest in art. 
 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Please find the data via Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/bak65/?view_only=a383541fae704caaba43b39a81ca2e31. Based on their 
answers to the questionnaire on art experience and interest, we built a score of art 
experience and interest for each participant. It was composed of the following three 
subscales: A) artistic practice (average out of artistic activity: “yes”=2/ ”no”=0 and 
competence in drawing: “yes”=2/ ”no”=0), B) art interest (average out of enjoyment of art 
history course in school: “very much”=2, “a little”=1, “not at all”=0 and intent to visit art 
exhibitions during the next year: “more than 3 times”=2 / ”more than once”=1 / “none”=0) 
and C) art experience (average of frequency of visits to exhibitions last year: “more than 3 
times”=2 / ”more than once”=1 / “none”=0, estimation of having an eye for art: “yes”=2 / 
“no”=0 and having read a book on art: “yes”=2 / “no”=0). We assigned non-trained 
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participants to two groups based on a median split of data: 20 of them scoring low on art 
experience and interest (M=.40, SD=.28), 20 scoring high (M=1.49, SD=.419). The 13 
graphic design students scored slightly higher on art experience and interest (M=1.63., 
SD=.25). 
Given the specific background, experience and motivation of graphic design students 
we interpreted them as stemming from a different population than the non-trained students. 
Consequently, we report their data separately. Five ratings were excluded from the analysis 
of non-trained participants due to response times that were far from those of a gut feeling 
response, even when considering reading and elaboration (> 40 s). We averaged all other 
ratings of level of appearing contradictory by non-trained participants across stimuli and 
compared these average values for each of the sentential formats via a mixed-design 
ANOVA with format (a1 vs. a2 vs. b vs. c) and category (art vs. non-art) as within-
participants factors and art experience and interest (low vs. high) as between-participants 
factor. It revealed a large main effect of format—F(3, 114)=41.37, p<.001, ηp2=.521—a 
small main effect of category—F(1, 38)=5.37, p=.03, ηp2=.124—and a small interaction 
effect between format and category—F(3, 114)=3.94; p=.01, ηp2=.094. Before turning to 
differences between participants, we will discuss the specific pattern for sentential formats 
and object-categories.  
Simple main effects revealed significant differences between all sentential formats 
for non-trained participants (see Figure 1). We found lower ratings for sentences that imply 
sensory appeal despite non-beauty (a1) than sentences implying a beautiful object of no 
sensory appeal (a2). Sentences combining sensory non-appeal with beauty (a2) appeared 
more contradictory than those including other evaluative adjectives (b, c). As hypothesized, 
sentences referring to art-related concepts were generally estimated as slightly less 
contradictory (M=3.24, SD=.96) than those referring to non-art artefacts (M= 3.44, SD=.83), 
this difference was significant as revealed by a paired t-test: t=-2.29, p=.03, Cohen’s 
d=0.362. This was mainly due to differences for sentential formats (a1) and (b) whereas for 
formats (a2) and (c) the difference was non-significant (see Figure 1). As simple main 
effects in Table 1 show, b and c were similarly contradictory for non-art, whereas for art-
related concepts the difference was significant. 
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Figure 1. Average level of appearing contradictory for different sentential formats and 
context categories based on evaluations by non-trained participants. Significant differences 
(Simple main effects) are marked by an asterisk. Note that further differences were 
significant (all p<.001) – those between (a1) and (b), (a1) and (c), (a2) and (b), and (a2) and 
(c). Error bars represent ± 1 SEM. 
 
 
Table 1. Simple main effects, Bonferroni-adjusted. Significant differences are in bold. 
   
art   non-art  
comparisons Δ SEM p Cohen's d 
 
Δ SEM p Cohen's d 
 
(a1) liked but 
not beautiful vs. 
(a2) beautiful 
but not liked -1.28 .23 <.001 0.848 
 
-.91 .23 .002 0.616 
(a1) liked but 
not beautiful vs. 
(b) dynamic 
but not liked 1.79 .31 <.001 0.901 
 
1.97 .37 <.001 0.855 
(a1) liked but 
not beautiful vs. 
(c) elegant 
but not liked 1.00 .38 .073 0.404 
 
1.57 .39 .002 0.625 
(a2) beautiful 
but not liked vs. 
(b) dynamic 
but not liked 3.07 .29 <.001 1.670 
 
2.88 .36 <.001 1.270 
(a2) beautiful 
but not liked vs. 
(c) elegant 
but not liked 2.28 .29 <.001 1.262 
 
2.48 .29 <.001 1.340 
(b) dynamic 
but not liked vs. 
(c) elegant 
but not liked -.79 .19 .001 0.647 
 
-.40 .24 0.59 0.259 
 
 
We hypothesized that art experience and interest might be relevant for the level of 
appearing contradictory when sentences referred to artworks. Art experience and interest 
was a significant factor for level of appearing contradictory on its own as evident from the 
ANOVA—F(1,38)=7.27, p=.01; ηp2=.161. The interaction with category was non-
significant—F(1, 38)=1.85, p=.18, ηp2=.046 and the three-way interaction between format, 
category, and art experience and interest was a non-significant trend—F(3, 114)=2.41, 
p=.07, ηp2=.060.  
Figure 2 shows that for non-trained people with high scores in art experience and 
interest sentences appeared less contradictory if they referred to art (see Figure A1 in 
Appendix for diagrams regarding the other sentential formats). This difference was 
significant only for sentential format a1 (note again that the 3-way-interaction was a trend 
only). The graphic design students, however, differentiated less between art and non-art 
sentences. Given their low number of n=13, we did not conduct inference statistical analyses 
on their data. 
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Figure 2. Level of appearing contradictory for two sentential formats (a1) and (a2), concepts 
related to art or non-art and three groups of participants based on estimations of art 
experience and interest and training in Graphic design. Significant differences (Simple main 
effects) between object categories for each group of participants are marked by an asterisk. 
Error bars represent ± 1 SEM. See Figure A1 in Appendix for diagrams regarding sentential 
formats (b) and (c). 
Further analyses reveal that the relevance of art experience and interest might be 
driven by few cases only: Figure 3 shows each participant’s score in art experience and 
interest and the averaged difference in appearing contradictory between non-art vs. art-
related sentences (positive scores represent less contradiction for art-related concepts). A 
weak positive correlation of non-trained persons’ art experience and interest with that 
difference describes how art-related sentences were rated as slightly less contradictory by 
people with high art experience and interest (r=.38, p=.02). But only three participants with 
high experience and interest in art judged sentences referring to art-related objects much less 
contradictory than those referring to non-art and one participant of moderate art experience 
and interest judged them as much more contradictory (see lighter circles in Figure 3). When 
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excluding data by these participants, the correlation dissolves (r=.17, p=.31). In addition, we 
plotted corresponding data by trained participants (graphic design students) who did not 
show larger divergence between ratings of art- and non-art-sentences despite their high 
scores in art experience and interest. 
 
Figure 3. Individual scores in art experience and interest and difference in appearing 
contradictory for non-art vs. art-related sentences, averaged for each participant (positive 
scores=less contradiction for art-related concepts). Outliers are marked by lighter color. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
We examined the evaluative components of aesthetic statements by assessing how 
contradictory people rate notions combining non-appealing sensory appearance with beauty, 
elegance or dynamics and notions combining sensory appeal with non-beauty. (a1) “I like 
how X looks but it is not beautiful” appeared less contradictory than (a2) “X is beautiful but 
I don’t like how it looks”. This indicates that people rather accept that an object can be of a 
sensory appeal without being beautiful given the multiplicity of potential sensory pleasures 
of the mind, whereas beauty would rather imply sensory appeal. Such a comparison was 
exploratory given the lack of clear conceptualization of beauty which can refer to sensory as 
well as non-sensory aspects and can either be understood as “conforming to beauty 
standards” or as an emotion linked with uncertainty and meaningfulness without the 
necessity of sensory appeal. Note as well that the combination of sensory appeal and non-
beauty was not perfectly intuitive: Statements in the format of (a1) were evaluated as 
moderately contradictory. This finding therefore requires further examination.  
“X is beautiful, but I don’t like how X looks (sounds)” appeared more contradictory 
than “X is dynamic, but I don’t like how X looks (sounds)” and ”X is elegant, but I don’t 
like how X looks (sounds)”, pointing to the larger evaluative component of “beauty” 
(Hypothesis 1). We furthermore suggested that artworks can be of sensory appeal due to a 
wider range of evaluative dimensions than non-art artefacts—sometimes even despite or due 
to displeasing or non-beautiful attributes or motives. We therefore hypothesized that non-
beauty and sensory appeal (and potentially also beauty and sensory non-appeal) are more 
easily combinable in sentences about art than in those about non-art due to people’s 
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associations with encounters with ambivalent experiences of art (Hypothesis 2). When 
sentences referred to artworks, they indeed appeared slightly less contradictory to 
participants—this effect was mainly driven by sentential format (a1) “I like how X looks 
(sounds) but X is not beautiful” and (b) “X is elegant but I do not like how X looks 
(sounds)”. It was not significant for (a2) “X is beautiful, but I don’t like how X looks 
(sounds)” and (c) “X is dynamic but I do not like how X looks (sounds)”. It seems that also 
for art, people consider sensory appeal as being important for beauty, whereas it appears less 
contradictory to judge art as non-beautiful but of sensory appeal than for other artefacts. 
We further hypothesized that the difference between art- and non-art-related 
sentences would be pronounced for participants with high experience with and interest in art 
because they might be especially familiar with artworks that are ambivalent regarding 
beauty and sensory appeal and more focused on style or structure instead of pleasingness 
(Hypothesis 3). People with high experience and interest in art indeed rated sentences 
combining sensory appeal with non-beauty (a1) as less contradictory if they referred to art 
than to non-art. But in contrast to our hypothesis, the interaction between art experience and 
interest, sentential format and category was a non-significant trend only. Also, an additional 
group of Graphic design students did not seem to differentiate in a similar manner between 
art-related and non-art-related sentences although they scored high in art experience and 
interest. A visualization of average differences for each participant furthermore shows that 
only three art-experienced participants rated art-related sentences considerably less 
contradictory than those on non-art. Instead, people with high art experience and interest 
rated sentences to be less contradictory in general irrespective of their connection with art.  
It is well possible that participants had various concepts of beauty in mind during the 
task. Some notions of beauty refer to rather universal beauty standards (Grammer, Fink, 
Møller, & Thornhill, 2003) or associate it with pleasingness (e.g., Reber, Schwarz, & 
Winkielman, 2004), whereas others separate it from pleasingness and refer to a “free” 
beauty (Kant, 1790/1951), potentially involving challenge and promised meaningfulness 
(Armstrong & Detweiler-Bedell, 2008). Also, people might have thought about cases in 
which beauty is utilized in order to describe non-sensory aspects (a beautiful idea, etc.). 
Whereas additional (qualitative) approaches might be suitable to further examine which 
forms of beauty and appeal are considered when thinking about the presented sentences, our 
findings can be understood as a reflection of an important differentiation between hedonic 
states and aesthetic pleasures of the mind induced by art. Other expressions than “I like how 
X looks (sounds)” might reveal further differences in how contradictory sentences appeared 
if they referred to art vs. non-art. It would be interesting to additionally include adjectives 
that relate to negative and positive emotions in a variety of ways – we could for instance 
state “I am fascinated by X but it is not beautiful”, “I like how X looks, but it is not 
thrilling”, “X is beautiful, but it did not surprise me” or “X is beautiful, but it did not touch 
me”. It would hereby be promising to utilize combinations of adjectives that have been 
extracted from evaluations of paintings as the two separate (non-correlated) factors of 
affective tone (e.g., lovely or appealing) and aesthetic experience (e.g., awing or 
exceptional, Marković, 2010). 
Pleasures of the mind can be attributed to many episodes in life, not only to those 
with art. We need to consider that by presenting the contradictory sentences during our 
study, we might have induced an “aesthetic” mindset that made people think about 
alternative sensory pleasures beyond beauty for all kinds of artefacts, also non-art – e.g., by 
thinking about appreciated visual features of a design that do not please in a conventional 
manner. Another shortcoming of our approach is that the mere combination of some 
adjectives with non-art artefacts can sound unusual; e.g., a jacket can be judged concerning 
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its “elegance” but rather rarely concerning its “dynamics”. Part of the estimations for 
“elegant” and “dynamic” might therefore stem from this unusualness, not from the 
evaluative component of the utilized adjectives alone. Again, qualitative methods should 
further complement our approach to explore which aspects might have induced how 
contradictory sentences appear.  
It seems important to note that a slightly decreased level of appearing contradictory 
for sentences referring to art-related objects does not imply that sentences did not sound 
contradictory at all: Instead, the moderate to high average estimates either point to the 
rareness in which sensory appeal collides with non-beauty and beauty with sensory non-
appeal or the low awareness to the very common usage of negative affect in the arts (for 
such an argument in case of negative emotions see Menninghaus et al., 2017). Meanwhile, 
we need to consider the possibility that people are familiar with but are not aware of an 
object’s contrasting effects on pleasure in many cases. Whereas our method provides an 
intuitive access to specifics of the sensory appeal of non-beauty for different categories of 
objects, it is crucial to note that we measured responses to sentences about objects, not to 
objects themselves (neither in different contexts and different modes). The method is limited 
by the available associations and reflections of people’s own experience when confronted 
with these sentences.  
We can only speculate at this point that a greater number of associations with 
encounters with art might strengthen the awareness that sensory appeal and non-beauty can 
co-exist, e.g., by a training to shift one’s focus from represented content to composition and 
material, encounters with extreme cases of pleasing non-beauty, or by explicit art theoretical 
discussions of the ambivalence between both. Meanwhile, we did not find a clear effect of 
art experience and interest on the divergence between statements on art and non-art based on 
our data. The difference in how contradictory sentences (a1) on art vs. non-art appeared 
might also reflect a focus on Western Modern to Post-Modern and Contemporary artworks 
that are associated with ambiguity and contrasts to conventional hedonic pleasure (see also 
considerations by Dissanayake, 2009; and Krieger & Mader, 2010). Social distinction by 
rejection of conventional forms of beauty due to such an understanding of “high art” might 
also be a reason for reduced levels of appearing contradictory. These motives might account 
for people of high education in general irrespective of a specialization in the aesthetic 
domain. Furthermore, we cannot exclude that our non-standardized questionnaire is 
confounded with other characteristics of the participants (e.g., states or traits) that might 
allow for various explanations for this effect (such as differences in level of education). For 
graphic design students, the category of objects (art/non-art) did not affect how 
contradictory sentences appeared and their ratings were generally high when compared to 
other participants with high scores on art experience and interest. This makes us cautious 
about any strong interpretation of the relevance of art experience and interest for the 
described effects. It is furthermore possible that different kinds of engagement with aesthetic 
objects can lead to different criteria for their evaluation. It would be highly interesting to see 
if graphic designers might be slightly biased towards valuing generally accepted aesthetic 
properties of images and objects and less focused on other potential pleasures of the mind 
which might not be accepted by clients and potential customers. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
“Beautiful” contains a large evaluative component: If we describe something as beautiful, 
we often intend to evaluate its appearance. But various pleasures of the mind can cause 
sensory appeal, even in contrast to beauty. Aesthetic statements such as 
 
(a1) I like how X looks (sounds), but X is not beautiful, 
 
appear slightly less contradictory if they refer to art. Presupposed that statements on art 
actually reflect people’s experiences with art, our findings might point to relevance of 
negative valence (e.g., Konečni, 2005; Menninghaus et al., 2017), dichotomy between 
content and material (Pepperell, 2015), contrasts between aesthetic and artistic criteria as 
well as ambivalence and ambiguities (Muth & Carbon, 2016) when it comes to art. 
Meanwhile, we need to consider that personal differences in experience might have an effect 
on the consideration of combinations of non-beauty with sensory appeal and sensory non-
appeal with beauty.  
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Level of appearing contradictory for two sentential formats (b) and (c), concepts 
related to art or non-art and three groups of participants based on estimations of art 
experience and interest. Error bars represent ± 1 SEM. 
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Table A1. Instruction before the sentences’ evaluation (original and translated). 
 
 
  Instruction 
original	 	 translated	
Wir präsentieren dir im Folgenden 
verschiedene Sätze, die dir mehr oder 
weniger merkwürdig erscheinen 
werden. Wir interessieren uns dafür, 
wie widersprüchlich sie dir erscheinen.  
 
Der Begriff der "Widersprüchlichkeit" 
ist hier weit gefasst: Er beschreibt die 
Wirkung eines Satzes, der auf 
irgendeine Art absurd oder merkwürdig 
"klingt". Schätze bitte auf einer Skala 
von 1-7 ein, wie stark widersprüchlich 
dir der aktuelle Satz erscheint und 
drücke eine entsprechende Taste: 1 ist 
"gar nicht widersprüchlich" und 7 "sehr 
widersprüchlich". Es gibt hierbei keine 
richtigen oder falschen Antworten, 
bewerte bitte einfach spontan, wie der 
Satz auf dich wirkt.  
 In the following, we will present 
sentences which sound more or less 
strange to you. It is interesting to us, 
how contradictory they appear to you.  
 
 
Hereby, the concept of „contradictory“ is 
broad: It describes the effect of a 
sentence that sounds absurd or strange in 
some way. Please estimate on a scale of 
1-7 how contradictory the current 
sentence appears to you and press a 
corresponding key: 1 is "not at all 
contradictory" and 7 "very 
contradictory". There are no right or 
wrong answers, please just rate 
spontaneously how the sentence appears 
to you. 
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